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Abstract 
This paper studies the endogenous emergence of political regimes, in particular democracy, 
oligarchy and mass dictatorship, in societies in which productive resources are distributed 
unequally  and  institutions  do  not  ensure  political  commitments.  The  political  regime  is 
shown to depend on resource inequality as well as on economic development, reflected in 
the production structure. The main results imply that for any level of development there 
exists  a  distribution  of  resources  such  that  democracy  is  the  political  outcome.  This 
distribution is even independent of the particular development level if the income share 
generated by the poor is sufficiently large. On the other hand, there are distributions of 
resources  for  which  democracy  is  infeasible  in  equilibrium  irrespective  of  the  level  of 
development. The model also delivers results on the stability of democracy. Variations in 
inequality across several dimensions due to unbalanced technological change, immigration or 
changes in the demographic structure affect the scope for democracy or may even lead to its 
breakdown. The results are consistent with the different political regimes that emerged in 
Germany after its unification in 1871. 
Keywords 
Income inequality, development, democracy, coalition formation, factor endowments, 
demographic structure. 
JEL Classification 
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 1 Introduction
In the history of modern Germany three critical junctures occurred which required the
implementation of a new political regime. They led to the proclamation of the German
Reich in 1871, the Weimar Republic in 1919, and the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949.
However, despite the strong presence of democratic movements since the rst half of the
19th century a stable democracy emerged only at the last juncture. This raises the
question why a democracy was not implemented earlier successfully. And what were the
reasons for the instability and the eventual breakdown of the democratic Weimar Republic
which was overthrown by the Nazi regime? Or, more general: Why do democracies
emerge, and what makes some of them last while others vanish?
The importance of political institutions, and in particular that of democracy, for eco-
nomic development has been one of the most intensely researched areas of the recent
years. Democracies typically implement many of the institutions and policies that are
thought to be benecial for economic development, like rule of law, social insurance, or
wide-spread education, and thereby allow for a comparably ecient resolution of conict-
ing interests. Yet, relatively little is known about the determinants of democracy and
its stability, even beyond the historical example of Germany. Among the rst to address
these issues was Seymour Martin Lipset, who conjectured in his famous study that higher
levels of economic development and a more equal distribution of resources imply a higher
probability for a country to become and to stay democratic:
\Democracy is related to the state of economic development. Concretely, this
means that the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will
sustain democracy. (...) A society divided between a large impoverished mass
and a small favored elite would result either in oligarchy (dictatorial rule of
the small upper stratum) or in tyranny (popularly based dictatorship)."
Lipset (1959, p. 75)
But irrespective of Lipset's seminal impact on the eld of democratization theories,
most of the subsequent literature that studies the transitions from oligarchy or autocracy
to democracy has concentrated attention exclusively on one of the two factors identied
3by Lipset, economic development or inequality, but not on both. And even more impor-
tantly, most of this literature on democratic transitions treats democracy as an absorbing
state and thereby assumes that conicts within such political regimes are solved on the
basis of \democratic rules", which obviously implies the existence of some institutional-
ized environment that ensures these rules to be binding. Assuming democratic rules to
be eective seems to be a critical assumption, however, that is unlikely to hold when
democracy itself is at stake. Rather, an institutionalized environment cannot be taken for
granted when considering the stability of democracy. Or, as Przeworski (2006, p. 312)
puts it: \Democracy endures only if it is self-enforcing. It is not a contract because there
are no third parties to enforce it." This implies that the stability of democracy needs to
be studied in a similar environment as the emergence of democracy from non-democratic
rule.
In this paper we consider democracy as an endogenous outcome of a political conict
about the redistribution of incomes within a society in which the income generating factors
are distributed unequally. The main novelty of our approach is the consideration of the role
of both dimensions, the level of economic development and the distribution of resources,
within a heterogeneous society in which no exogenous institutions exist that ensure the
possibility to make credible political commitments. Instead, political decisions are made
in an environment in which no binding agreements about income redistribution can be
made among the dierent groups of factor owners, and sub-coalitions or single groups can
use their de facto power to implement their preferred redistribution scheme against the
will of others. In this competition for political power, inequality across several dimensions
becomes key for the determination of the politico-economic equilibrium in terms of the
political structure and the ex-post allocation of incomes.
The main result of this paper is a novel characterization of the conditions under which
democracies emerge or break down in the absence of exogenous institutions that ensure
the credibility of political commitments. The equilibrium is characterized by a ruling
coalition that is stable and winning against any other challenging coalition. The equi-
librium is a democracy if political decisions are not made by a minority within society
but by the overall population. Equilibria where a minority dominates political decisions
4represent oligarchies.1 The results provide a characterization of the levels of inequality
and development, reected by the distribution of the dierent factors in the population
and their relative importance in the income generating process, for which democracy or
oligarchy emerges in equilibrium. The model also illustrates the consequences of changes
in inequality, in terms of population structure and/or factor endowments, or in the eco-
nomic environment reected by the economic importance of the dierent factors, for the
stability of democracy. Apart from allowing for a realistic analysis of the stability of
political regimes in heterogeneous societies, the approach of considering political regimes
as equilibrium in weakly institutionalized environments delivers new insights about the
necessary conditions for the emergence and stability of democracy.
The results and implications of the model are consistent with the sequence of political
regimes as they emerged in Germany after its unication: the elite-led German Reich,
the unstable Weimar Republic that nally led to the Nazi regime, and the democratic
republic after World War II. The three corresponding critical junctures in German history
in the years 1871, 1918/19 and 1945 provide an ideal context to illustrate the working
of the model. In all three situations, the previous political regime had ceased to exist
for exogenous reasons { either due to the unication of previously independent and of-
ten competing countries, or due to the loss of one of two immensely costly wars. As a
consequence, the shape of the country, the demography and the economic conditions in
terms of inequality and economic development had changed dramatically as compared to
the respective pre-existing order. This required the emergence of a completely new polit-
ical regime. The model provides a structural explanation for the very dierent political
regimes that emerged under these conditions: a constitutional monarchy that de facto
represented a conservative oligarchy of a landed gentry in the German Reich 1871-1918,
a very unstable parliamentary democracy after 1919 that was characterized by several
coups and civil conicts that nally led to the rule of the Nazis 1933-1945, and a stable
parliamentary democracy after 1945/48.
This paper contributes to a growing literature on endogenous political institutions.
Similar to the seminal work of Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2001, 2006), it is the
redistributive threat by part of the population that brings about a democratic equilibrium.
1The precise denition and classication of equilibria is presented in Section 3.
5However, in addition to these repercussions of income inequality, the level of economic
development is also relevant in the present paper as it aects the economic importance
of certain production factors.2 The model below also diers from most other frameworks
that study the endogenous emergence of democracy like e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson
(2000, 2001, 2006), Boix (2003), Lizzeri and Persico (2004), Llavador and Oxoby (2005),
Gradstein (2007), Cervellati, Fortunato, and Sunde (2008), in that it is not (implicitly or
explicitly) assumed that the population consists of dierent groups among which coalition
formation is not a problem or even an issue at all, and that any conict of interest
in democracies can be resolved by credible commitments concerning the policies or the
coalitions that are formed. In this respect, our work also diers from Acemoglu and
Robinson (2008) who explicitly address the question of regime persistence. The present
paper studies the emergence and breakdown of political regimes in an environment in
which such credible commitments are not possible, even in democracy. To this end, our
analysis builds on the work by Acemoglu, Egorov, and Sonin (2008) who consider the
problem of coalition formation in situations where binding agreements among dierent
groups or parties cannot be made, since no party can commit not to eliminate other parties
from the ruling coalition in the future. Our model explicitly deals with the concrete
problem of coalition formation among distinct groups that represent dierently endowed
segments of the population and struggle for the redistribution of factor incomes. Finally,
since we consider technological progress to be the key driver of income inequality along
the lines of Kuznets (1955) or Acemoglu (2002), the determination of political outcomes
corresponds with the ideas of Rogowski and MacRae (2008) who deliver various historical
examples that are in line with the functioning of our model and thereby complement our
case study on Germany.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 lays out the model framework, and section
3 presents the results concerning the political equilibrium. In section 4 the model is nested
in a production economy, which allows us to relate the political equilibria to the economic
environment in general equilibrium. In section 5 we present the main results concerning
the emergence and stability of democracy. Section 6 illustrates the implications of our
model in the context of Germany's history after 1871 and points to various other historical
2See Cheibub and Vreeland (2010) for a recent survey on the relationship between economic develop-
ment and democracy.
6examples. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Population Structure and Production
Consider a static economy that is populated by a unit mass of individuals. These individ-
uals live for one period and leave no bequests. Since consumption is the only component
of utility, individuals maximize their disposable incomes. While each individual possesses
an identical endowment of labor time, h > 0, physical strength and intellectual ability
are distributed unevenly in the population.3 For simplicity, we assume the distribution of
both of these characteristics to be dichotomic which means that a share  > 0 of individ-
uals possesses one unit of physical strength, denoted by l = 1, whereas the complement
is left with no physical strength at all, l = 0. Likewise, a share  > 0 of the population
possesses intellectual ability, a = 1, while all others lack this trait, a = 0. We assume
physical strength and intellectual ability to be mutually exclusive. Thus the population
eectively consists of three distinct groups: the able weaklings, denoted by A, the simple-
minded strong, L, and those that possess neither strength nor ability, P.4 Denote the set
of groups by S = {A;L;P} and the respective size of group i ∈ S as si with
si =
⎧ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪
⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
 if i = A
 if i = L
1− − if i = P
(1)
where si > 0 ∀ i ∈ S. Accordingly, the factor endowments of particular group members
are given by
li =
⎧ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪
⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
0 if i ∈ {A;P}
1 if i ∈ {L}
and ai =
⎧ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪
⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
0 if i ∈ {L;P}
1 if i ∈ {A} :
(2)
3The endowment of labor time h can be normalized to 1 without loss of generality.
4In principle, our model society could comprise an arbitrary number of groups, and none of our main
results depends on the particular population structure we impose. However, the case with three groups
is the least complex to deliver our main results. Increasing the number of groups would complicate the
analysis without adding new essential insights.
7All individuals inelastically supply their endowments on competitive markets to a pro-
duction sector that uses labor time, strength and ability as separate inputs. Income Y is
generated by means of a production function
Y = Y (A;H;L;) ; (3)
where Y (⋅) exhibits constant returns to scale with respect to the input factors H, L and
 which represent the aggregate levels of working hours, physical strength and ability,
respectively. A > 0 represents a productivity parameter or vector, reecting the level
of technology. The marginal product of every input factor q is positive but decreasing,
i.e. @Y ~@q > 0 and @2Y ~@q2 < 0. Factor prices are competitive where  = @Y ~@H represents
the price paid for one unit labor time, w = @Y ~@L gives the remuneration of physical
strength, and  = @Y ~@ is the reward for ability. Consequently, the factor income of an
individual belonging to group i is given by
yi = h+wli +ai with i ∈ S : (4)
From the unequal endowment of traits and the remuneration of these traits on competitive
markets it follows that factor income is distributed unequally within the population, and
individuals with higher endowments earn higher factor incomes. This implies that an
individual in the P-group always receives the lowest factor income yP in society and
yP < yL;yA : (5)
always holds. Note that per-capita income y equals aggregate group income, i.e.,
y = Q
i∈S
siyi = h+w + : (6)
2.2 Political Power and Utility
The given endowment of production factors implies that factor incomes can vary con-
siderably between dierent groups which gives rise to redistributive conicts, since we
assume the utility of individuals or of members of a certain group not to be aected by
8the well-being of others. In consequence, a latent conict between the dierent groups
exists and every group tries to maximize its respective income at the expense of others.5
All political considerations in the model are therefore reduced to the question of how the
income generated by the members of society is redistributed amongst them. We assume
that in principle all income can be expropriated and redistributed between groups, such
that the feasible transfer equals per-capita income y = ∑i∈S siyi.6 In combination with
the given production structure the possibility to expropriate all factor income has the
important implication that it is always benecial to employ all available workers in the
production process and redistribute their incomes afterwards, as yi > 0 follows from equa-
tion (4). Since factors are supplied inelastically, there are no hold-up problems or the like
through which the political game aects or distorts the production process.
Given the possibility to expropriate factor incomes we need to elaborate on the po-
litical dimension of our model and, in particular, consider the question which group or
coalition of groups actually makes political decisions and eectively imposes its preferred
redistribution scheme on the entire population. As already mentioned before, we consider
an environment where no institutions exist that would allow for binding commitments
between groups. Thus, no group can make binding oers of how to redistribute income,
and no group that is part of the coalition that redistributes income can commit not to
exclude other members of that coalition and make political decisions autocratically later
on. Given this environment we assume that it is the political power Pi of group i that
describes its potential to redistribute factor incomes. To keep the conict game simple
and concentrate on the issue of coalition formation, we model the redistributive conict as
parsimoniously as possible and assume that any group or coalition Q can seize the income
of group or coalition SQ if PQ > PSQ holds where PQ = ∑j∈QPj denotes the aggregate
power of group or coalition Q. To link the economic and political environment we assume
5For simplicity, and contrary to Olson (1965), we assume that no commitment problems exist within
groups, i.e., single group members do not free-ride on other members of their group. This implies that
our analysis is equivalent to one of a society that consists of three dierent agents, each representing one
income group. Thus, individual members of a group and the group itself can be interchangeably denoted
by i. A justication for this assumption is that the collective action required in the case of intra-group
conict is transitory, and hence much easier to sustain, see, e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson (2006).
6One could alternatively assume that some subsistence income, for example the factor income from
time endowment, can be retained by each individual to ensure that production takes place without
changing the main results.
9that this political power of a group or coalition is given by its aggregate income, i.e.,
PQ ≡ Qi∈Qsiyi : (7)
This assumption could be motivated by means of a sequential conict game with perfect
information and certain outcome where richer groups can aord more weapons, soldiers,
etc., and hence overcome poorer groups in open conict. Additionally, we assume the
power mapping described by equation (7) to be bijective such that no two groups can
be equal in power, Pi ≠ Pj ∀ i;j ∈ S for i ≠ j.7 For notational convenience, we dene
the most powerful group iMAX to have power PMAX and size sMAX. From this, it follows
that the most powerful group is able to make all political decisions alone if, and only if,
2PMAX > PS holds where PS = ∑i∈S Pi.
If no group has the power to rule alone, i.e., 2PMAX ≤ PS the possibility to form
a coalition becomes relevant. On the one hand, coalition formation is associated with
making concessions to the other members of the coalition with regard to the desired
redistribution scheme. Hence, forming part of a coalition is costly in terms of foregone
redistribution to the other members of the coalition. On the other hand, being part of a
coalition increases political power by pooling resources for a potential conict with other
groups or coalitions. A last aspect of the political environment concerns the question
of how the income seized by a particular coalition is redistributed among its members.
Since we do not focus on the redistributive implications of our model we assume disposable
income ̃ yi of group i to be determined by
̃ yi = ̃ piy ; (8)
with ̃ pi being the eective relative power of group i given by
̃ pi =
⎧ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪
⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
Pi
∑j∈RC Pj if i ∈ RC
0 otherwise
(9)
7As will turn out later this assumption is not only convenient but also plausible, since group income
and { due to xed relative group sizes { political power is aected by technological progress and other
exogenous factors.
10where RC ⊆ S denotes the coalition that ultimately redistributes income which we call
the ruling coalition.8 The setting implies that the utility of an individual depends on
the disposable income ̃ yi and therewith on the eective relative power ̃ pi of the group it









> 0. Since factor income yi and group size si cannot be changed by individ-
uals, the optimization problem amounts to maximizing ̃ pi in order to maximize lifetime




ui(̃ yi(̃ pi)) subject to (4), (6), (8) and (9). (11)
Thus every individual always prefers the coalition in which the relative power of the
group i ∈ S he belongs to is greatest.9
2.3 Timing of Events
The following description of the non-cooperative ruling coalition formation and redistribu-
tion game that is played by every generation completes the timing of events. The sequence
of events that a particular generation experiences throughout its lifetime is given by
A. Birth, realization of endowments and factor incomes.
B. Ruling coalition formation and redistribution game  :
8In this respect, we simply follow Acemoglu, Egorov, and Sonin (2008) by employing a sharing rule that
was rst used by Gamson (1961) to characterize the sharing of resources amongst coalition members. As
several empirical studies suggest, see e.g. Warwick and Druckman (2001) or Ansolabehere et al. (2005),
this seems to be a fairly good description of redistribution within coalitions. Given its strong empirical
regularity it is often even referred to as Gamson's law, see Frechette, Kagel, and Morelli (2005). However,
we only adopt this rule for analytic simplicity. Note that for RC = S from equations (6) and (7) it follows
that ̃ yi = siyi. In general, any rule can be applied without qualitatively aecting our results as long
as it satises that (a) every member of a coalition that seizes income of others gets a positive share of
redistributed income; but (b) this share does not grant any member more power than the sum of all
others; and (c) it does not perfectly equalize the power of any two members.
9Since the utility of an individual is determined by the structure of the RC, our game is hedonic in
the sense of Dreze and Greenberg (1980).
11B.1 At the initial stage of the game k = 0 an agenda setter is randomly determined
from all groups and proposes a sub-coalition (that includes herself).
B.2 The members of this sub-coalition vote sequentially in random order over the
proposal (and all non-members automatically vote against it):
B.2.1. If the proposal is not supported by a winning coalition, the game proceeds
to step B.3.
B.2.2. If the proposal is supported by a winning coalition and consists of
a) all voting groups, then they all form the RC and the game proceeds
to step C.
b) a proper subset, then all groups that are not part of this proposal
are excluded from participation in the game by redistributing their
factor incomes toward the members of the winning subset. Now a new
stage k +1 begins and the game proceeds to step B.3.
B.3 From all (remaining) groups a new agenda setter is randomly determined
among all groups that have not yet acted as agenda setter at the current stage
of the game k; she proposes a sub-coalition (including herself), and the game
proceeds to step B.2. If all remaining groups have been agenda setters at the
current stage k, then they all form the RC and the game proceeds to step C.
C. Consumption of disposable income and death.
3 The Political Equilibrium
We start our analysis of political equilibria with a central Lemma on the equilibrium
outcome of the game described above.
Lemma 1. In game   there exist subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNEs) in pure strate-
gies which all lead to the same RC.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition for the equilibrium characterization of the ruling coalition RC is as
follows. First, a RC must { by the nature of the game { be winning in the sense that
12it is powerful enough to outgun any alternative coalition that may challenge it at the
current stage k of the game. And second, every RC must be stable such that none of its
proper subcoalitions will be winning and become the new RC at a subsequent stage of
the game ^ k > k.10 Apart from that, we can also characterize the RC in terms of its size.
Lemma 2. The RC consists of all groups if and only if the most powerful group is
dominated by the rest of society, i.e. PS ≥ 2PMAX ⇐⇒ sRC = 1 .
Proof. This proof is straightforward since we know from the proof of Lemma 1 that the RC
must be a subset of all winning and stable coalitions. Due to the bijective power mapping,
a coalition of two groups cannot be stable, since one group always dominates the other, and
therefore could always successfully propose an even smaller coalition that only contains
itself at a subsequent stage of the game. Hence, SRCS ≠ 2 always holds where SRCS denotes
the cardinality of set RC. Thus, it immediately follows PS ≥ 2PMAX ⇐⇒ sRC = 1.
Before we proceed, it is worth commenting briey on the underlying concept of society,
in particular concerning the ability and the incentive for certain income groups to secede
in order to escape taxation. In our model, it is the exploitation of political power rents
that constitutes a centripetal force and prevents society from falling apart.11 Secessions
are ruled out endogenously in equilibrium, since the groups who would be better o on
their own, the net tax payers, are not powerful enough to split from the RC, whereas
the RC, who would be powerful to split from the rest of society has no incentive to do
so, because this would make its members worse o.12
Note that so far, the political equilibrium was characterized without any reference to
political concepts. But the equilibrium itself can be interpreted as reecting a particular
10This second equilibrium property goes back to Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston (1987) and their
concept of a Perfectly Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibrium which was already studied in several other
contexts, see for example Moreno and Wooders (1996) or Einy and Peleg (1995). See also Acemoglu,
Egorov, and Sonin (2008) for a modication in the context of political games. Note that this reasoning
corresponds to the conceptualization in terms of the set 
 in the proof of Lemma 1, which gives a formal
denition of the RC.
11Even though this result might contradict the empirical observation of an increasing number of
sovereign states over the last century, it should be kept in mind that this model exclusively focuses
on economic mechanisms and thereby ignores other factors like ethnic, religious or cultural identity,
which play a prominent role in separation processes of political entities in reality. In our model, we take
the size of the polity as exogenously given, for instance due to geographical or historical reasons. For a
model where state size is determined endogenously, see, e.g., Alesina and Spolaore (1997, 2003).
12In this respect our model very much diers from Boix (2003) whose results depend on the assumption
of asset specic factor mobility and the existence of some outside option for the owners of mobile assets.
13political regime. To simplify the terminology, we rst introduce a simple classication
of equilibria that follows directly the conceptual distinction of political regimes made by
Lipset (1959) in the introductory quote.
Denition 1. In equilibrium the political regime is ...
1. ... a democracy if sRC = 1;
2. ... a mass dictatorship if 0:5 ≤ sRC < 1;
3. ... an oligarchy if sRC < 0:5.
In the context of our model we dene an oligarchy as a RC that represents the minority
of the population and imposes policies on the rest of society.13 On the opposite, we call
every political system a democracy when the RC embraces the entire population and
hence all income groups. In this case, all groups of society are bound together by the fact
that no smaller coalition is winning and stable. Then even the small minorities play an
active role in policy determination and are actively integrated by all others. From this
denition of a democracy, one must distinguish a popularly based or mass dictatorship in
which the ruling coalition represents only one single group that constitutes the majority
of the population. In such a political regime a minority of the people is expropriated and
not involved in political decision-making.14
This distinction between a democracy and a mass dictatorship is not obvious from a
normative perspective, since in both cases the majority of the population is involved in the
redistribution decision.15 However, in a mass dictatorship, the largest group has the power
to dominate all other groups of society that are minorities and extract redistribution from
them. It is this monopoly of political power within a mass dictatorship that contradicts
13Naturally, one might give an even more detailed denition of oligarchies, depending on which group
rules. For example, an oligarchy of group P could be denoted as an ochlocracy (the rule of the mob),
whereas an oligarchy of group A or L represents a plutocracy (the rule of the rich in the respective
situation).
14Note that our notion of a mass dictatorship fundamentally diers from the concepts of partial democ-
racies or restricted franchise as in Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) or Lizzeri and Persico (2004) respec-
tively which both rest on the implicit assumption that binding commitments between dierent groups
can be made.
15One could argue that it eectively makes no dierence for the political outcome whether a homoge-
neous majority directly dictates the public actions (redistribution in the concrete case), or whether the
same majority competes in a democratic ballot with opposing groups who de jure have the right to vote,
but will de facto fail in achieving their political goals. This would be in line with the famous reasoning
of Aristotle (1943) who dened democracy as an inferior form of government where the state is ruled by
the many who only pursue their private interests.
14the typical connotation of a democracy in which dierent groups of society can express
their will and inuence public decisions.16 With this terminology in mind, we state the
following proposition regarding the dierent types of political regimes.
Proposition 1. In equilibrium, the political regime is ...
1. ... a democracy if and only if the most powerful group is dominated by the rest of
society, 2PMAX ≤ PS ⇐⇒ sRC = 1 ;
2. ... a mass dictatorship if and only if society is strictly dominated by a single group that
represents the majority of the population, 2PMAX > PS ∧sMAX ≥ 0:5 ⇐⇒ 0:5 ≤ sRC < 1 ;
3. ... an oligarchy if and only if society is strictly dominated by a single group that
represents a minority of the population, 2PMAX > PS ∧ sMAX < 0:5 ⇐⇒ sRC < 0:5 .
Proof. This Proposition follows directly from Lemmata 1 and 2 and the application of
Denition 1.
The necessary and sucient conditions contained in Proposition 1 map any distribu-
tion of factor endowments to a unique political regime in equilibrium.
4 The Politico-Economic Equilibrium
4.1 Production Environment and Factor Incomes
This section extends the previous analysis by endogenizing factor incomes with respect
to the distribution of strength and ability. To illustrate the main points, we adopt a CRS
specication of the production function
Y = (Aa+AlL)
 H1− ; (12)
with 0 <  < 1 and normalize the individual time endowment h to 1. Without being
essential for the results, this specication provides a simple way to model redistributive
conicts along the development path by dierentiating between ability-augmenting and
16This distinction between democracies and mass dictatorships not only links to the introductory
quote of Lipset (1959) but is also related to de Tocquevilles (1864) famous thoughts on the tyranny of
the majority.
15strength-augmenting productivity parameters Aa and Al with Aa;Al > 0.17 Assuming
perfectly competitive markets, the reward for every production factor equals its marginal









	 with i ∈ S : (13)
For the following analysis, let us dene i = siyi~y as the share of total income that is
produced by group i. Note that this expression also reects the relative power of group i,
i.e., i = Pi~PS. With the distribution of resources as in (2) and using the information
contained in equation (6), equation (13) can be rewritten as
P = (1− −)(1−) (14)
for the P-group,




for the L-group, and




for the A-group, respectively. As can easily be seen from equation (15) given a certain
value of  the relative power of the L-group increases in the importance of strength in the
production process reected by Al or in the size of the group , i.e., @L~@Al; @L~@ > 0.
This reasoning analogously holds for the other groups. And of course, any change that
makes one group relatively more powerful makes the others relatively weaker and vice
versa.
On the basis of these expressions, we can now characterize a unique politico-economic
equilibrium for any given distribution of production factors in the population.
17This specication of the production function is formally equivalent to the production of a homo-
geneous commodity in two distinct sectors, one employing exclusively ability together with time, and
the other exclusively physical strength together with time. Variations in productivity parameters aect
income levels as well as the shares of total income generated by an exclusive production factor while the
income share devoted to labor time remains constant. Note that our results are qualitatively unaected
when using a CES production function instead.
164.2 Endogenous Democracy
Every such politico-economic equilibrium reects the subgame perfect equilibrium of the
game described in section 2.3 including income production, formation of the RC and
redistribution. From Proposition 1 it can be seen that the particular political regime
emerging in equilibrium depends on the power and on the size of the most powerful group.
Since in general any of the three groups can be the most powerful we have to consider
both criteria for every group in society. Setting the relative power equations (14), (15)
























with f () = Al Al ( −1)
2 +Aa(1+(1−2)) > 0∀ ∈ (0;1). These conditions
represent the combinations of parameters for which the relative power of a particular
group is just equal to the power of all other groups together. Applying the same reasoning
with regard to group size delivers the parametric conditions for the size of a particular
group to represent exactly half of total population. The respective loci read
sP=0:5 = 0:5−; sL=0:5 = 0:5 and sA=0:5 = 0:5 : (20)
While all equilibria can be solved analytically, and the characterization of equilibria pre-
sented in Section 3 generally applies, we illustrate the results by ways of parametric
examples but to highlight the main results as well as their intuition. To illustrate our
analytical results we set Al = Aa = 1 and  = 0:5 as a benchmark example. In this case,
the income share of mere labor time which is distributed equally across all individuals
equals 0.5.
Figure 1 presents the corresponding allocation of politico-economic equilibria.18 The
- space is decomposed into dierent areas of - combinations that imply particular
18Note that the three-group version of our model is the simplest structure that allows to derive all
types of equilibria, including the grand coalition, and to analyze the results in a two-dimensional space.
17equilibrium constellations. From Lemma 1 it follows that there exists a unique equilib-
rium, in terms of RC and the corresponding redistribution scheme, for each single -
combination, i.e., everywhere in the admissible - space. The corresponding characteri-
zation of the respective political regime follows from Proposition 1.
Figure 1: Political equilibria with balanced productivity levels (Al = Aa = 1; = 0:5).
Given the population structure in our model the admissible - space is restricted by
the − axes for 0 < ; < 1 and the straight line  = 1− and thus constitutes a triangular
space.19 Within this admissible - space there is another triangular area of interest. It is
dened by the relative size loci given in equations (20). All - combinations outside this
triangular denote situations where one group represents the majority of the population.
For example, South-West of the straight line  = 0:5 −  the relative size of the P-group
is greater than one half. Similarly, for combinations of  and  above the the horizontal
line at  = 0:5 group A constitutes the absolute majority whereas for combinations of 
and  to the right of the vertical line at  = 0:5 group L represents more than half of all
people in society.
Since the political regime in equilibrium depends not only on the size but also on the
19Note that all points lying on one of the three boundaries are not considered in the following since
they represent societies with less than three groups, i.e., - combinations for which the size of (at least)
one group is zero.
18relative power of the most powerful group in society we must also consider the latter cri-
terion. Figure 1 shows the relative power loci that correspond to equations (18) and (19).
The concave, upward-sloping locus represents all - combinations for which A = 0:5
holds. Above this line, the members of group A generate more than half of total income,
A > 0:5, and therefore constitute the single most powerful group that can dominate in
open conict against any other group or coalition of groups. A larger endowment of abil-
ity than given by this condition { in terms of a higher value of  or combinations of 
and  above this threshold { makes the group A even more dominant. In this case the
political equilibrium is either a mass dictatorship (depicted by areas II) or an oligarchy
(areas III) depending on the respective  −  combination. The corresponding condition
for group L to be more powerful than the sum of all others is represented by the convex,
upward-sloping locus. To the right of this line described by equation (18), i.e., for higher
values of , group L is strictly dominating and constitutes the ruling elite. Finally, note
that Figure 1 does not contain a graphical representation of equation (17). Since the P-
group is disadvantaged in both relevant dimensions it can only rule the state on its own
if the income share devoted to the common production factor, 1 − , become suciently
large. Then, the size eect can compensate for disadvantages in factor endowments and
a dictatorship of the poor mass can be an equilibrium outcome.20
The rst main result that emerges from this discussion is the characterization of the
conditions, in particular of the distribution of resources in the economy, under which
democracy can emerge. These conditions are summarized in terms of areas I in Figure 1
which represent all combinations of  and  for which a democracy arises as an equi-
librium. As the gure illustrates, democracy is an equilibrium only when inequality is
moderate along the two dimensions  and , i.e., for intermediate values. The higher the
fraction of individuals with strength or ability within society, the more likely becomes a
mass dictatorship in which the respective largest group rules the state on its own. For
example, in the northern area II in Figure 1 the members of the A-group dominate the
political decisions and in the East it is the L-group that dominates all others. Note that in
principle a democracy could emerge everywhere in the − space whereas mass dictator-
20More precisely, sP (1−) > 0:5 must hold for this to be the case which can only be satised for
 < 0:5 and sP > 0:5. Thus the P = 0:5 locus can only emerge in the south-western corner of Figure 1
for  < 0:5. A graphical representation of this case is provided in the Appendix.
19ships can by denition only occur outside the inner triangular area. Thus the admissible
 −  space for democracies is larger than the one for mass dictatorships. All remaining
areas III denote oligarchies where the state is ruled by a single group that represents a
minority of the population.
5 The Stability of Democracy
Having identied the conditions for the emergence of democracy, the model also delivers
results on its stability with respect to two dimensions: rst, it allows for an analysis of
secular changes in the distribution of production factors via variations of  and , and
second, it can be used to trace the consequences of economic development in terms of
secular changes in the relative importance of production factors in the income generating
process, i.e., variations in Al and Aa.21
The eects of changing the distribution of production factors for a given level of eco-
nomic development, i.e., for a given combination of Al and Aa, can already be inferred
from the previous discussion of Figure 1. In particular, one can directly derive the conse-
quences of ceteris paribus changes in the population structure for the politico-economic
equilibrium. Applications for such an analysis are numerous. With regards to changes
in  one could think for example of massive schooling programs that change the distri-
bution of ability whereas epidemics or improvements in health provision can aect the
distribution of strength  within society. There might also be changes in the population
structure that aect both dimensions simultaneously, like asymmetric population growth
due to war casualties, ethnic cleansing, displacements, group specic birth rates caused
by a quality-quantity trade-o or immigration of individuals with particular endowments
of ability and strength. It is obvious that the results will depend on the status quo before
the change in population structure, as well as on the distribution of the other factor.
Massive increases in  will lead to an equalization of power and make democracy more
likely if applied to an economy with relatively few able individuals, and hence increase the
likelihood of democracy. Whereas in a situation in which only a few individuals do not
21Note that the model framework does not account for other non-economic factors that have been
considered as being important for the stability of democracy by political scientists, like e.g. civic culture
or democratic values, see Almond and Verba (1963) or Putnam (1993).
20have ability, i.e.,  is high, such a policy might induce a concentration of political power,
and make democracy less likely. In the benchmark case given above, it is a fairly balanced
distribution of production factors that provides the optimal environment for democracy
to emerge in equilibrium.22
A dierent picture arises when the eects of changes in the relative productivity of the
dierent factors, reected by Al and Aa, on the politico-economic equilibrium are taken
into account. Such changes might for example be caused by unbalanced technological
progress like skill-biased technological change, by natural disasters or by war. Before
going to the characterization of the implications for the politico-economic equilibrium,
it is worth noting that for any productivity environment there is always a scope for
democracy. This is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. There always exist admissible  − combinations for which a democracy
emerges in equilibrium ...
1. ... irrespective of the productivity environment Aa and Al for 0 <  < 0:5.
2. ... given a particular productivity environment Aa and Al for 0:5 ≤  < 1.
Proof. See Appendix.
The results of this Proposition are particularly noteworthy from a policy perspective.
They essentially state that the structure of the population, in terms of inequality in factor
endowments, rather than the level of development, is the central determinant for democ-
racy if a suciently large income share goes to the factors that are distributed equally
(i.e., for  being suciently small). In this case democracy can be established for any
productivity environment by ensuring a suitable distribution of factors or factor incomes.
In other words, democracy is feasible regardless the level of economic development. This
implication modies the introductory statement by Lipset, suggesting that the level of
development or income is of secondary importance for the emergence and the stability of
democracy compared to the distribution of factors. A similar but less pronounced result
holds if the income share going to unequally distributed factors () is relatively high.
According to the proposition, democracy is also always a possible equilibrium outcome,
22Since the relative importance of both exclusive production factors is equal in this case, i.e., Al = Aa,
the bisectrix constitutes a symmetry axis of the political landscape.
21but the necessary factor distribution depends on the level of development in terms of the
particular productivity environment.
The reverse statement is not true, however, as there exist certain factor distributions
for which the equilibrium outcome is never a democracy, irrespective of how the produc-
tivity environment looks like.
Proposition 3. For any 0 <  < 1, and irrespective of the productivity environment Aa
and Al, there exist admissible  − combinations for which ...
1. ... a mass dictatorship emerges in equilibrium.
2. ... an oligarchy emerges in equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix.
Hence, the model suggests that there are limits for the possibility to implement democ-
racies by mere technology or income transfers. To illustrate the implications of variations
in the relative importance of factors in the income generating process, we change the base-
line scenario and consider two stylized cases. The rst one refers to a society in which
physical strength is much more important than ability in the production process. This
we take into account by setting Al = 20 and Aa = 1.
The politico-economic equilibria for a society with strength as the dominant factor of
production are depicted in Figure 2. Again, as in Figure 1, area I represents democracies
whereas in all areas II a mass dictatorship occurs for sure. Finally, all areas III represent
oligarchies of the respective minority that is most powerful. The most immediate result
of this case is that there is much more scope for oligarchies. Additionally, democracy only
emerges as outcome in societies in which strength is a relatively scarce resource, i.e., 
has a low value, whereas it can emerge for a large range of values of . If  is too high, a
change in  has virtually no eect on the politico-economic equilibrium.
A dierent, yet somewhat symmetric picture emerges in the second stylized case when
considering a developed society. This case represents a society in which physical strength
has lost its relative importance and ability has become the predominant factor in the
income generating process. In our static model we replicate this kind of skill-biased
technological change in a very simplied manner by assuming Al to stay constant and
increasing Aa to 400. This scenario is depicted in Figure 3. The gure suggests that
22Figure 2: Political equilibria in a strength-dominated society (Al = 20;Aa = 1; = 0:5).
changes in  only aect the equilibrium outcome if the distribution of  is not too high,
similar to the previous case. In an economy of this type, in which ability is by far the
most important factor for production, even small variations in , for example due to
immigration of high-skilled workers or some other asymmetric change in the demographic
structure, can have far-reaching implications for the politico-economic equilibrium, up to
the point that democracy becomes infeasible in equilibrium. In this respect, the model
can rationalize to what extent demographic change, in particular with respect to the
distribution of low-skilled and high-skilled labor, may provide a challenge for existing
democracies. This way, the model can also give some guidance as to what are the likely
consequences of drastic demographic changes or policies.23
6 Empirical Implications and Historical Evidence
To illustrate the model's implications, we begin by discussing evidence from three critical
junctures in Germany's recent history, each of which was breaking grounds for the emer-
23An example would be the one-child policy conducted by the Chinese government which might not be
sucient as a regime-stabilizing measure in the long run since { despite its potentially preserving eects
on the population structure { changes in the technological environment are not taken into account.
23Figure 3: Political equilibria in an ability-dominated society (Al = 20;Aa = 400; = 0:5).
gence of a completely new political regime: the period following its unication in 1871, the
aftermath of World War I, and the period after Germany's capitulation in World War II
in 1945. These three dates mark crucial turning points in German history which were
preceded by substantial changes in territory, population, and the economic environment
in terms of inequality and the corresponding production structure. In all three cases the
previous regime had ceased to exist and a completely new political regime had to emerge
while the process leading to these breaks was not related to the domestic struggle for po-
litical power in any respect. These exogenous breaks from the past were the consequences
of a unication process and of the unforeseen outcome of two self-inicted major wars.
In this regard, the three critical junctures in German history provide a perfect setting to
illustrate the working of our model. In all three situations dierent groups of society were
confronted with the possibility, or even need, to implement a new political regime that
served their purpose. As stipulated by the model, the emerging regime had to be stable
and self-enforcing against the background of imminent civil war and open conict. We
conclude our empirical discussion by providing further historical examples from dierent
countries and epochs where wars or exogenous shocks in technology changed the distribu-
tion or importance of production factors and subsequently triggered institutional change.
246.1 Germany 1871: The Emergence of the German Reich
Prior to 1871, there was a large number of independent German regional kingdoms and
principalities. The largest and most dominant of these kingdoms were Prussia and Austria,
which formed the so-called pentarchy together with England, France and Russia during the
18th and early 19th century. What later was to become Germany therefore essentially
consisted of largely independent feudal states, each with a monarch or sovereign that
controlled political power. In many of the German states, there were some liberal and
democratic movements in the rst half of the 19th century that were combined with
some tendencies towards a German nation state, and which culminated in the revolution
of 1848 and the famous constitution of the Frankfurt assembly. These tendencies were
successfully repressed by the leading elites in the years after 1849, however. Eventually, a
German nation state emerged under the primacy of Prussia, the so-called \Lesser German
solution". At the same time Austria formed a multi-ethnic state with Hungary in 1867.
After three unication wars in 1864 against Denmark, in 1866 against Austria and in
1870/71 against France, the German Reich was founded in 1871 in the Hall of Mirrors of
the Palace of Versailles near Paris with the proclamation of the Prussian king Wilhelm I.
as the rst German emperor. As head of the state he appointed Otto von Bismarck rst
Chancellor (Reichskanzler) of the German Reich who at that time also served as head of
the executive of the kingdom of Prussia.
The unication of then 17 more or less independent states within one German Reich
raised the question about the appropriate political regime.24 Dierent interest groups tried
to shape the Reich according to their ideas. There was a strong landed gentry and nobility,
which had dominated the small states, but there were also tendencies trying to establish
a parliamentary democracy following the ideals of the revolution of 1848. However, the
democratic movement was split into dierent factions. Liberal forces were seeking to
establish a moderate democracy with monarchistic elements and restricted franchise, while
left-wing social democrats wished to establish a democracy with universal franchise and a
radical reform of the economic system. Bismarck proposed electoral rules along the lines
of the Frankfurt assembly, but he also deeply despised a truly democratic regime. In fact,
to maintain the aristocratic order he repeatedly threatened to prohibit social-democratic
24For a detailed description of the dierent political tendencies see Botzenhart (1993), chapters 8 and 9.
25and catholic-centrist parties. Bismarck's government was \... in principle hostile towards
parties and constitution" (Botzenhart, 1993, p. 119). At several occasions he made clear
that he would rather destroy all democratic elements and mount a coup to re-establish a
corporatist state under the leadership of the nobility than to concede minimal democratic
reforms. And until World War I, the nobility and the conservatives successfully prevented
any attempt to implement democratic reforms that would grant the parliament eective
inuence over the executive or the military whose leaders largely belonged to the nobility.25
The success of the conservative nobility can be understood in light of the geographic,
economic and demographic structure of the Reich at the time of its foundation. By
the 1870s, industrialization had just began in Germany and was mainly concentrated
in the Western part of the Reich around Rhine and Ruhr whereas huge areas ranging
from the east of the Rhine all the way up to the Baltic Sea beyond K onigsberg (today's
Kaliningrad) and including large states like Bavaria, Wuerttemberg, or Saxonia, were still
agrarian. During the 1870s, almost two thirds of the population still lived in the coun-
tryside and about half of the active population worked in agriculture while the primary
sector contributed a little less than 40% of total net domestic product.26 These patterns
of the economic structure of the German Reich are illustrated in Figure 4. At the same
time, a huge fraction of Germany was still in the hand of the landed gentry. In 1879 about
40% of all manors in Prussia and Pomerania belonged to them.27
In light of Proposition 1, this made an oligarchy under the landed gentry the natural
candidate for a politico-economic equilibrium in the German Reich. Considering the rural
society in Germany around 1871 as one in which physical strength was the dominant factor
of production and given the relatively large and strong landed elite, one can infer the high
likelihood that the political regime would be characterized by an oligarchy, as illustrated
by the areas III in Figure 2. Despite the progressing industrialization, the changes in
the demographic structure due to dierential fertility, and the corresponding evolution in
inequality, this political regime remained stable until World War I.
25See also Winkler (1993), p. 610.
26Urbanization data is from B ahr (2004). Data on the economic structure is taken from Homann
(1965), Tables 1.6 and 2.20, where agriculture includes agriculture, forestry and shing.
27The data for landownership reect the social structure of ownership of manors, in terms of nobility,
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Figure 4: Economic Development and Structural Change in Germany.
Five-year averages calculated from Homann (1965), Tables 1.6, 2.20.
6.2 Germany 1919: From Weimar Republic to Nazi Germany
Germany's entry into World War I was largely independent from domestic politics, and
in particular, it was not driven by a democratic movement. In fact, political forces from
the entire spectrum agreed in a \class truce" (Burgfrieden) to postpone major domestic
political reforms to the time after the war. Also the outcome of this war, the defeat of
Germany and Austria-Hungary in 1918, came unexpected for the German political leaders
and ended with the abdication and exile of the German Kaiser. Hence, the monarchy
ceased to exist and an intense political struggle arose about the most appropriate political
regime to be implemented. The consequences of the self-inicted war for Germany were
disastrous in terms of national debt, geographic losses and war casualties. More than two
million people died on the battleelds, compared to around 14 million soldiers and a total
population of around 67 million in 1914, Eastern Prussia and Alsace-Lorraine were lost
and the victorious powers imposed massive reparation obligations on post-war Germany.
Moreover, many of the soldiers had been traumatized by their experiences in the trenches
27and had become callous in the face of the tremendous violence they had seen. In the riots
that broke out at the end of the war, many therefore did not shy away from using violence
against fellow citizens whom they accused of recklessly forcing them to sacrice their lives
on the battleeld. According to the Dochstolegende put forward by the military elite
the war was not ended on the battle eld by foreign military but by domestic socialist
forces who were accused of having stabbed in the back of the German army. Despite riots
with numerous casualties, an outright civil war could just be avoided. All these factors
brought about a fundamental change in the political and economic environment.
Given these circumstances, a coalition of moderate conservatives, liberals and social
democrats managed to implement a parliamentary democracy, known as the Weimar
Republic.28 The constitution of Weimar stipulated universal surage and control of the
parliament over the executive but also contained elements of a strong sovereign in the
person of the president who had the power to suspend the parliament and to install a
strong executive which could act independently of the legislative in times of crises. In the
1920s, starting with the immense economic burden imposed by the reparation payments
and culminating in the Great Depression Germany suered a permanent instability of its
political regime.
In this period, the Weimar Republic saw an ongoing polarization at both ends of
the political spectrum given by communists and social democrats on the left, and ultra-
conservatives and national socialists on the right. Supported by the ultra-conservative
president and former general von Hindenburg, conservative politicians with an inherently
anti-democratic attitude implemented deationary policies and countered the parliament's
protests by weakening the parliament more and more.29 In a series of emergency decrees,
the parliament was eventually suspended by Br uning in 1930 despite the obvious strength-
ening of the Nazi-movement. Br uning was followed by von Papen, formally a conservative
from the center, but with an ultra-conservative attitude who intended the establishment
of a corporate state under the leadership of the landed aristocracy, and his \cabinet of
barons".30 Despite the widespread belief that the biggest threat to the republic came
from the right-wing Nazi-movement, many conservative politicians including von Papen
28The following description mainly draws on Botzenhart (1993) chapters 13 and 14.
29See Schulz (1992), in particular chapters 2 and 10.
30See Dederke (1996), p. 247-250.
28still believed they could contain the Nazis once in power. Von Papen, in a sort of coup,
also dismissed the Prussian state government and became acting commissioner of Prus-
sia in addition to being German chancellor. This virtually meant the elimination of the
fundamentals of a federal state since police, judiciary and administration of the largest
German state were now directly controlled by the chancellor. These newly created struc-
tures substantially facilitated the implementation of a dictatorship by the Nazis after the
January elections of 1933 that brought Hitler into power.31 In these elections, the Nazis
only collected somewhat less than 44 % of the votes despite the fact that the election cam-
paign and the elections were accompanied by substantial violent repressions of left-wing
parties and voters by Nazi paramilitary gangs.32 The Nazis had to form a coalition with
an ultra-conservative party to get to power, but once Hitler was installed as chancellor, it
took the Nazis only a bit more than one year to turn Germany into a dictatorship using
the loopholes in the Weimar constitution. Power was granted by the fact that Hitler had
control over the largest paramilitary army that he used openly to threaten with civil war
in the early 1930s.33 What followed was a political regime that executed unparalleled
atrocities in the holocaust and various waves of ethnic cleansing, that started a war which
was without comparison in history, and that ultimately led to the destruction of Germany
and its political system.
Again, the model presented in this paper can shed light on the mechanisms that led
to the emergence of a weak and unstable democracy that eventually gave way to the
Nazi regime. Despite the war and the associated losses of territory and population, the
population structure in 1919 had remained largely unchanged compared to 1871. Yet,
compared to 1871, the economic environment had changed substantially by the end of
World War I, as is illustrated in Figure 4. By the early 1920s, the employment share
in agriculture had fallen by roughly 20 percentage points compared to the time after
German unication and only about 20% of the net domestic product was produced in
the primary sector between 1925 and 1935. At the same time, industrial production had
become more important than agriculture and had received a further push by managed
eorts to make war production more ecient.34 Correspondingly, the population in the
31See Dederke (1996), p. 249.
32See Botzenhart (1993), p. 171 and Dederke (1996).
33See Winkler (1993), p. 613.
34See Schulz (1987), chapters 4 and 5 for details.
29cities and industrial centers had grown more than twofold leading to a signicant increase
in the urbanization rate with roughly two thirds of the population now living in urban
areas.35 Nevertheless, there possibly exists no parallel of another industrialized society in
which a pre-industrial elite could retain as much political power as the landed gentry in
the Weimar Republic, see Winkler (1993). The ongoing economic development caused a
structural change in the economic environment. Assuming in the absence of reliable data
that working hours and capital intensities per person were roughly equal and constant
in both sectors, Figure 4 implies that the relative productivity Aa~Al between the two
sectors was much larger in the Weimar Republic than in times of the German Reich.
In terms of the stylized model, this substantially higher relative productivity results
in a smaller income gap between the two high-income groups, L and A as compared to
the agricultural society of 1871.36 In fact, the available data on pre-tax income inequality
as measured by the the Pareto coecient  seems not to contradict this interpretation.37
Figure 5 below shows Pareto's  over the period 1871 to 1938 for three of the major states
of the German Reich, Baden, Prussia, and Saxony, as well as for the Weimar Republic as
a whole.38 The gure suggests that equality of incomes was on average lower in the times
of the German Reich than in the times of the Weimar Republic, as reected by the lower
values of Pareto's  in the period before World War I.
The data also show that equality increased during the rst years after the foundation of
the Reich in 1871, but then slowly decreased over time until World War I.39 Considering
35See B ahr (2004).
36Note that this does not imply a monotonous relation between an increase in the relative productivity
and income inequality in our model.
37The Pareto-coecient used to be a common measure of inequality. When observing the distribution
of incomes Pareto (1896) assumed the number N of people earning at least income x to be best described
by some function N = Ax− with A and  being constants. According to this reasoning, in a society
with a high  a smaller fraction of individuals earns an income equal or above x than compared to
a society with a lower . Despite all obvious shortcomings of this measure, see e.g. Lorenz (1905) or
Bresciani-Turroni (1939), in this respect higher values of  are considered to represent more equal income
distributions ceteris paribus. To the best of our knowledge, there are no other data on income inequality
available for the time period under consideration.
38Baden, Prussia and Saxony represent about 70% of total population living in the German Reich,
see Hohorst, Kocka, and Ritter (1975), and almost 75% of that in the Weimar Republic, see Petzina,
Abelshauser, and Faust (1978). Population data is available only for 1871, 1890, 1910, 1925, 1933, and
1939. The remaining data are calculated by assuming exponential population growth between these dates.
39In 1891 a major tax reform was implemented in Prussia in order to collect more reliable income data.
Thus, the true value of the Pareto coecient might have already been lower in the years before. With
Prussia representing around 90% of the population in our sample this could explain the pronounced drop
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Figure 5: Income Distributions in Germany.
Data from Homann (1965), Table 2.123, Hohorst, Kocka, and
Ritter (1975), and Petzina, Abelshauser, and Faust (1978).
this measure of income distribution, it therefore appears as if incomes in the Weimar
Republic were more equally distributed than in the German Reich.40 And as Dumke
(1991) points out, this dierence mainly stems from changes in the composition of the
high-income groups. Given the evidence presented in Figures 4 and 5, it therefore appears
as if in the Weimar Republic the economic environment is best described by the one
depicted in Figure 1. With moderate levels of  and slightly higher values of , the
equilibrium emerged in an area of Figure 1 where all three regimes had some relevance,
somewhere in the central lower part. This explains the inherent instability of the Weimar
Republic despite its even by modern standards progressive democratic design.
The dynamics during the Weimar Republic that eventually led to the collapse of
democracy and the emergence of the Nazi regime can also be rationalized in light of
the model. Despite their political inuence at the beginning of the Weimar Republic, the
40This conclusion is also in line with the assessment of Kuznets (1955) regarding the evolution of income
inequality in Germany in the 18th and 19th century, as well as with the evidence cited by Acemoglu and
Robinson (2000).
31landed aristocracy lost inuence slowly but signicantly during the 1920s as a consequence
of the ongoing structural changes shown in Figure 4, see also Zollitsch (1999).41 This
creeping descent of the political power of the nobility together with the presence of a
structural indeterminacy in the Weimar Republic, in terms of dierent feasible equilibria,
might have provided the scope for a single, unscrupulous man with extraordinary political
talents to ultimately implement and stabilize an oligarchy of the \strong", the Nazis, as
reected by area III.42 By repression, expropriation and terror, the Nazis formed the
economy in terms of population composition and inequality in a way to stabilize their
regime and rule out any political change until their ultimate defeat in 1945. In fact,
Figure 5 suggests that inequality increased substantially during the rst years of the Nazi
regime, reected in a pronounced drop of Pareto's .43
6.3 1945: Towards a Federal Republic of Germany
The war and the terror caused by the Nazis devastated large parts of the world, and
also Germany. Until 1945, acts of war and inhumanity like the holocaust and dierent
measures of ethnic cleansing had cost the lives of more than 10 million Germans. Huge
territorial losses like almost the entire Prussia and a virtually complete destruction of
infrastructure and production facilities marked a deep caesura (the so-called \hour zero",
Stunde Null) in German history. The landed elite had lost most of their estates, and had
been decimated substantially by war and repression.44 As a result, Germany 1945 looked
entirely dierent from what it used to be in the early days of the Weimar Republic, or
even at the beginning of the Nazi dictatorship. The political regime had to be completely
41This is reected in political reforms at the expense of the aristocracy that were implemented in this
period. For example, from 1928 on, manor districts were legally no longer considered as political entities
on a communal level in Prussia which eectively ended the political dominance of land owners in such
communities.
42Such an interpretation taking into account the interplay between the structural setting and individual
talent would be in line with the famous study of Bullock (1964) on the reasons for the rise of Hitler. One
could also argue that given the directed changes in the economic structure and its high popularity, Nazism
eventually turned out being a mass dictatorship during the late 1930s and is therefore better represented
by area II.
43See also Jeck (1968) and Morrisson (2000).
44As in World War I, large parts of the ocer corps consisted of men of the nobility but the Nazis
became increasingly distrustful about the support of the nobility during the war, which is why the nobles
lost inuence in the military. As a reaction to several attempts to assassinate Hitler, culminating in the
attempt of July 20, 1944, by von Stauenberg and his group, the Nazi regime killed many ocers they
accused of conspiracy, a large fraction being of noble decent, see e.g. Reif (1999).
32re-established under the occupation by the four allied forces, the USA, England, France
and the Soviet Republic. In the so-called \Bizone", the territory occupied by the USA
and England, the Germans were given the freedom to develop a federal structure and
a constitution that would enable the formation of a democratic political system. The
drafts of the new constitutions for federal states (L ander) and for communities had to be
authorized by the respective occupying powers. This happened fairly quickly in the years
after the war without a signicant exertion of inuence on the constitutional details by
the allies. The construction of a national state was impeded by the diverging interests
of the allied forces with the Soviets trying to expand their direct inuence in Germany.
Struggles between the Western allies and the Soviets culminated in dierent policies of
containment that led to the Cold War, and eventually to the establishment of two German
states in 1948.45 The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) as a parliamentary democ-
racy was established in the Western part of Germany comprising the American, English
and French occupation zones. In their zone, the Soviets installed the so-called German
Democratic Republic (GDR) as a socialist state which was essentially undemocratic and
heavily controlled by the Soviets. Since the possibility of external inuence is beyond the
consideration of our model we focus on the FRG in the following.46
The constitution of the federal republic stipulated a modern parliamentary democracy
with universal and equal franchise. After the demise of the old elite, the defeat of the
Nazis, and under the impression of the Soviet inuence in the GDR, the political climate
in Germany was very moderate and pragmatic. There was a consensus among the three
leading political movements, the social democrats, the conservatives and the liberals, to
establish a political regime that would avoid the loopholes and problems of the Weimar
Republic while keeping some of its progressive features.47 Social democrats and conser-
vatives had their own proposals, but in a famous \constitutional convent", the draft of a
45See Eschenburg (1983), p. 375.
46Historically, this procedure appears to be justied also on grounds of the fact that the GDR collapsed
in 1989 and joined the FRG in the process of German re-unication in 1990. The political system of the
FRG was sustained in re-unied Germany.
47Scholars like Dahrendor (1965) went as far as to argue that the destruction of the traditional social
structures by the Nazis, and the ultimate defeat of Nazi Germany constituted a prerequisite for the
emergence of the liberal and modern democracy after 1945. According to Dahrendor (1965, p.155), it
was the social inequality and the persistence of traditional corporative structures that had impeded any
progress towards a modern democracy in the German Reich and in the Weimar Republic. In his view,
this was mainly because it was in the interest of the politically dominant groups of society, consistent
with the discussion above.
33new constitution (Grundgesetz) was nished in just two weeks. The constitution emerged
from this draft after it was ratied by the constitutional assembly and authorized by
the allied forces without serious objections, is { with minor modications { still in eect
today.
In the light of the model presented in this paper, the emergence of a stable democ-
racy that encompasses all parts of society and that in many ways still represents a model
democracy for large parts of the world today can be rationalized by the very equilibrated
economic and political interests after the devastation and the defeat in the self-inicted
Second World War. Abstracting from the immense war-related destruction of production
facilities, the industrial structure was very similar to that in the Weimar times, as exem-
plied by the virtually identical employment shares in agriculture over the period from
the 1920s to the late 1940s.48 From Figure 4 one can also see that the primary sector
had lost further economic importance during the Weimar Republic and the Nazi period.
However, when again assuming constant working hours and capital intensities per person
the relative productivity between both sectors seems to not have changed dramatically
indicating a fairly similar economic environment to that in 1919. Thus, the German econ-
omy at that time might still be best described by a level of development as depicted in
Figure 1 { with the most salient dierence being the much lower inequality after World
War II due to a more equal demographic structure.
According to the study of Morrisson (2000) who analyzes the income distribution
within Germany from 1870 to 1990 inequality had decreased after World War II compared
to the pre-war era, and then remained almost stable at historically low levels. With
all groups of society being of similar importance, and the need to focus attention on
reconstruction and development, the politico-economic equilibrium in this situation is
likely to be one of democracy, as represented by areas I. To complement this picture,
Figure 6 displays the development of income levels in Germany using the data from
Maddison (2003). With income levels after World War II being even lower than after
World War I or at the end of the Weimar Republic, the data seems to lend further
support to the model prediction that inequality and the distribution of resources, rather
48Mitchell (2003, Table B1) provides data for the rst year directly after the war. According to his
numbers, the shares of economically active men working in agriculture evolved from 23.3 % in 1925 to
22.5 % in 1933 when Hitler came to power, to 22.6 % in 1946. For women, the respective numbers are
43.3 %, 40.7 % and 40.6 %.
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Figure 6: Income Development in Germany.
Data from Maddison (2003), Table 1c.
In the aftermath of World War II, the reconstruction and development in Germany was
fairly balanced, the recovery was fast and accompanied by policies intended to stabilize
the political and social situation. Led by later chancellor Ludwig Erhard, the currency
and the welfare system were reformed in order to atten out wealth inequality and to
level economic conditions, at least to a certain extent. The goal was to implement a so-
called \social market economy" which would mitigate social conicts, ensure a moderate
political climate and thereby stabilize the economy by maintaining the conditions nec-
essary for a democratic politico-economic equilibrium. The recovery was complemented
by international support through the Marshall plan, which was intended as a measure of
policy of containment against the Soviets.49
49See also Eschenburg (1983), p. 432-445.
356.4 More Historical Examples
The theoretical result that economic inequality, reected by the distribution of resources,
might be the crucial factor for institutional stability as well as for institutional change
appears to be consistent with many other observations in history. In fact, Rogowski
and MacRae (2008) argue that the majority of historians, including economic historians,
agree that exogenous changes in inequality due to warfare or shocks in technology or de-
mographics have been the major determinant for institutional change in human history.50
The dierent historical events consistent with this line of causality include the emer-
gence and collapse of the democracy in Ancient Greece, the collapse of the Roman Re-
public into a de-facto dictatorship, the rise of feudalism under the Merovingians, the
tendencies towards liberation of tenants in response to the Black Death in the 14th cen-
tury, the reformation movement in the 15th and 16th century, the rise of absolutism in the
17th century, as well as the rst and second waves of democratization in the early 19th and
in the 20th century, respectively. Rogowski and MacRae (2008) make the convincing case
that all these events were triggered by an initial exogenous shock that changed inequality
and subsequently led to a change in political institutions. In line with the theoretical
predictions of the model above, changes in inequality and institutions appear to occur in
both directions, indicating that the stability of institutions in general, and of democracy
in particular, might crucially depend on inequality. For instance, democratic reforms in
ancient Greece were induced by a drop in inequality which was caused by changes in
military technology that made a lightly armored infantry, the hoplites, favorable over the
former dominant knights. Conversely, the increasing professionalisation of the army in the
Roman Empire, or the adoption of the stirrup in the middle ages, gave more economic and
political power to smaller elites. This led to transitions towards more oligarchic structures,
reected in the breakdown of the Roman Republic and the rise of Caesarism, or the rise
of feudalism in medieval Europe. Likewise did demographic or technological shocks, such
as the Black Death or the movable type, which led to a reduction in inequality, eventually
50Rogowski and MacRae suggest that these exogenous shocks are likely to have changed both inequality
and institutions, and propose an explanation that is based on standard political economy arguments
regarding the link between inequality and public goods provision. Although this explanation is consistent
with dierent degrees of franchise that are optimal from the perspective of the rich political entrepreneurs,
it also rests on the implicit assumption of an institutionalized environment unlike the theory presented
above.
36give rise to a more equal distribution of political power. The wars of the Napoleonic times
as well as the World Wars required huge armies and workforces, thereby also causing a
reduction in political and economic inequality.
In summary, the historical evidence collected by Rogowski and MacRae (2008) sug-
gests that exogenous changes in inequality were the major driver behind major institu-
tional changes in history. One aspect that appears noteworthy in this context is the fact
that most of the historical examples of changes in inequality were also associated with
an increase in economic living standards. In some cases, however, inequality increased,
whereas in others it decreased, pointing towards the importance of inequality, rather than
income levels, for the emergence and stability of political institutions.
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper has developed a model of political institutions in which democratic or oligarchic
rule emerges as equilibrium outcome of a political struggle for redistribution in a weakly
institutionalized environment where no binding agreements between dierent groups of
society can be made. The results show that factual inequality along several dimensions,
in terms of the distribution of factors in the economy as well as of their importance in the
income generating process, is key for the resulting political institutions. Democracies can
emerge only in fairly balanced economic environments whereas alternative conditions give
rise to various forms of oligarchies or mass dictatorships. The main results are robust to
several extensions of the model, including the consideration of more income groups or the
implementation of other production technologies, and are in line with historical evidence
on changes in political regimes. In particular, the model can rationalize the emergence
of dierent political regimes in Germany after its unication in 1871. Apart from that,
our results suggest that the advent of democracy neither is an indispensable event in the
process of development nor necessarily marks the beginning of an era of eternal stability
of democracy.
The results have several relevant implications. First, democracy might not be the
automatic outcome of economic development, consistent with the evidence produced by
Acemoglu et al. (2008, 2009). The fact that dierent political regimes can emerge for
37comparable levels of income and economic development is also suggested by the historical
data for Germany as provided by Figure 6. Second, the model shows that the distribution
of factors or incomes, rather than the level of economic development, very often is key for
democracy to emerge. Again, this result is supported by the observations from Germany's
history. Facing fairly equal levels of income at three critical junctures, a stable democracy
in Germany emerged only after the third juncture in 1945, when the distribution of factors
and incomes was more balanced than at the previous junctures, see also Figure 5. Our
results suggest that democratization is possible at every level of economic development if
the distribution of production factors lies within a certain range. Third, the model also
implies a note of caution in that the situation of a stable democracy does not necessarily
constitute an absorbing state. Even if democracy eventually emerges, it might not be
stable in the long run but only be a temporary phenomenon. Hence, democracy might
fail if income discrepancies and redistributive tensions between the dierent social groups
become too large. The model characterizes the conditions under which this is the case.
In particular, ongoing technical change and economic development that aects dierent
groups of society in dierent ways, as well as increases inequality and polarization may
potentially lead to a breakdown of the democratic equilibrium and to the (re)emergence
of an oligarchy or a mass dictatorship.
The model presented in this paper suggests various directions for future research.
Several implications of the model can be tested empirically, including the prediction that
democracies are more likely to emerge in balanced economic environments with fairly equal
factor incomes. In this context, it would also be interesting to investigate the structure
of democracy, in terms of the emerging ruling coalitions, under dierent scenarios of
economic development and resource distribution, as well as the corresponding patterns of
income redistribution. Another interesting avenue for future research would be to link the
model closer to the empirical and theoretical concepts of polarization and fractionalization,
as developed by Esteban and Ray (1994, 2008) and Alesina et al. (2003). Finally, a
dynamic version of the model could be used to investigate the interdependencies of the
political regime and the corresponding policies on the one hand, and endogenous factor
accumulation and technological change, as well as the associated changes in the income
distribution on the other.
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43Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
We rst show that for any group there exists a pure strategy prole ∗ that is a SPNE
and leads to a unique RC.
Part I. Existence. This part of the proof follows the structure of the proof of Lemma 1
in Acemoglu, Egorov, and Sonin (2008). First consider the preferred coalition of agenda
setter i ∈ Sk at stage k ∈ {k ∈ N0 ∶ k ≤ 2} of game   where Sk is the set of all (remaining)
groups whose income has not been redistributed away up to the current stage of the
game, i.e., S0 = S, Sk ⊂ S ∀k > 0 and Sk ≠ ∅∀k. Let P (Sk) denote the power set of Sk
and let Ii = {I ∈ P (Sk) ∶ i ∈ I} be the set of all coalitions that include group i whereas
Fi = {F ∈ IiSk ∶ 2Pi > PF} represents the set of all coalitions in which group i is more
powerful than the other coalition members at the current stage of the game excluding
the set of all (remaining) groups. For notational convenience we set P (∅) = ∞. Let
Wk = {W ∈ P (Sk) ∶ PW > 0:5PSk} be the generic set of winning coalitions and denote the
set of stable coalitions as Ek = {E ∈ P (Sk) ∶ [∄Q ⊂ E ∶ 2PQ > PE ∧SQS = 1]}. Additionally,
let us dene the union of the set of coalitions that are both winning and stable and
the set of all (remaining) groups at the current stage of the game which is given by
Rk = [Wk ∩Ek] ∪ Sk where the coalition that exhibits the lowest aggregate power in this










and the pure strategy prole for group i reads
∗
i;k =
⎧ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪
⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
agenda-setting stage: i proposes i;k
voting stage: i votes
⎧ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪
⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
yes if j;k = i;k ∨ j;k ∈ Fi
no otherwise :
where j;k denotes the proposal made by group j ∈ Sk on which groups currently vote.
44Now we need to prove that the pure strategy prole ∗ which is a vector of ∗
i;k∀i;k con-
stitutes a SPNE. Since we consider a nite game it is sucient to show that there exists
no one-shot deviation from ∗
i;k which is protable for group i at any given history h of
the game. In order to do this we need to distinguish two cases each one itself containing
two subcases, since in this sequential game any group i is either an agenda setter (case A)
or a voter (case B) at a given history of the game, and any proposed redistribution policy
can either be rejected (subcase 1) or accepted (subcase 2).
Case A
In this case we show that group i cannot benet from making a proposal i;k ∈ Ii that
diers from that stipulated by ∗
i;k. We need to distinguish two subcases.
Subcase A.1. Let us assume that there exists such an alternative proposal i;k ≠ i;k
and that i;k is rejected if proposed. Then, obviously i;k must be accepted if proposed
as otherwise group i would not benet from making this proposal. By denition we know
that i;k ∈ Ii ∩ Rk holds. Suppose rst that i;k = 
k. In this case, i;k is only rejected
by others if {i} = 
k holds. But then making a proposal i;k ≠ i;k cannot be benecial
for group i. Now assume i;k ≠ 
k. This implies {j} = 
k with j ≠ i. Obviously, since i;k
is not accepted in this case there can exist no i;k ∈ Ii which would not also be rejected.
For this reason no deviation from ∗
i;k can be benecial in the given subcase.
Subcase A.2. Let us now suppose that there exists an alternative proposal i;k ≠ i;k
and that i;k is accepted if proposed. Note that by the nature of the game i;k ∈ Rk holds
as no proposal i;k ∉ Wk can be accepted and no proposal i;k ∉ Ek will be accepted. Fur-
thermore, no proposal i;k ∉ Ii can be made by group i. Hence i;k ∈ Ii∩Rk needs to hold.
Given our assumption of a bijective power mapping i;k ≠ i;k then implies Pi;k < Pi;k
since i;k = argminX∈Ii ∩Rk P (X). With regards to the optimization problem (11) we can
therefore conclude that it is not benecial for group i to propose i;k instead of i;k in
the given subcase.
Case B
Subcase B.1. Suppose that instead of voting yes according to ∗
i;k voter i would be better
o if he voted no. Since the votes of the other groups do not depend on the decision of
group i such a behavior could only cause a rejection of a proposal that would have been
45accepted otherwise if group i is pivotal for the decision outcome. In every other case such
a deviation has no eect on equilibrium outcome and therefore cannot be benecial. For
this reason, let us assume that group i is pivotal for the decision outcome and that it
votes no contrary to ∗
i;k.51
To understand why no such deviation can be benecial for j;k = i;k is trivial since
from the perspective of group i there exists no better proposal on which will be voted on
at the given stage of the game according to ∗ (see Case A). Note that if {i} ≠ 
k then
i;k = Sk. In this case voting yes of the pivotal group i would preserve the status quo and
prevent the possibility of j;k = 
k being made afterward. Voting no and thereby rejecting
a proposal j;k = i;k can therefore not be benecial. Now suppose that j;k ∈ Fi holds.
Since Fi consists of all coalitions in which group i is more powerful than all other coalition
members, it is clear that whenever one of those coalitions is proposed and accepted given
{i} ≠ 
, then ̃ pi becomes maximal at the subsequent stage of the game. Thus, in the
absence of redistribution costs it cannot be benecial to vote no if j;k ∈ Fi. Note that
Sk ∉ Fi such that voting yes for j;k ∈ Fi always implies group i to become an agenda
setter again at the subsequent stage of the game. We can therefore conclude that it is not
benecial to vote no contrary to ∗
i;k for any group i ∈ S at any stage of the game.
Subcase B.2. Now suppose that instead of voting no according to ∗
i;k group i would
be better o if it voted yes. Again, this could only aect equilibrium outcome if group i's
decision is pivotal and leads to the acceptance of a proposal that would have been rejected
otherwise. Let us assume it does. Here, we only need to consider the case where j;k ≠ i;k
and j;k ∉ Fi holds. In this case, it is obvious that a deviation from ∗
i;k cannot be benecial
for group i since such a decision would lead to an unstable coalition in which group i is
not the most powerful group. Given this, income of group i would be redistributed away
at the subsequent stage of the game if such a proposal was accepted. We can therefore
conclude that it is not benecial to vote yes contrary to ∗
i;k for any group i ∈ S at any
stage of the game.
Part II. Uniqueness. Finally, we need to show that all SPNEs lead to the same RC. Note
that the assumption of a bijective power mapping implies that in equilibrium dierent RCs
cannot be equal in aggregate power. To see this suppose, by contradiction, that PM =
51For consistency, and without loss of generality, the strategy of non-pivotal or indierent voters is also
assumed to be characterized by ∗ in the following.
46PQ holds for the two equilibrium coalitions M;Q ∈ P (S){∅} which are not identical,
M ≠ Q. Obviously, the bijective power mapping directly rules out SMS = SQS = 1 in the
given case. Additionally, a coalition of two groups can never be an equilibrium outcome,
because, due to the bijective power mapping, it would not be stable as the stronger group
could always propose a winning subcoalition only containing itself at a later stage of the
game. And uniqueness in the case of the grand coalition comprising all three groups is
trivial. Therefore we can conclude that in equilibrium any two coalitions M and Q can
only be equal in power, PM = PQ, when they are identical, M = Q.
Under strategy prole ∗ the resulting RC does not depend on the moves of nature.
Therefore the SPNEs in our nite coalition formation and redistribution game with
perfect information can only lead to dierent RCs if a pivotal group i is indierent about
her action at a certain decision node. Suppose rst that group j is not part of the
equilibrium coalition and is indierent at a given history of the game h. Then S
S = 1
immediately follows and group j cannot be pivotal. Now suppose that the pivotal group i
is part of dierent equilibrium coalitions and is indierent at a given history of the game h.
This can only be the case if (at least) two actions lead to the same equilibrium payo
which requires { given the optimization problem (11) and the political power of group i
{ the aggregate power of (at least) two dierent RCs to be the same. With regards to
our former reasoning this is impossible. Thus there cannot exist two dierent equilibrium
coalitions between which any pivotal group i ∈ Sk is indierent at a given history of the
game h. This establishes the proof of Lemma 1.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof of Proposition 2.1. The proof shows that for 0 <  < 0:5 there exist  −  combi-
nations for which a democracy emerges in equilibrium irrespective of the productivity
environment Aa and Al.
Note rst that from 0 <  < 0:5 it follows directly that 0 < 1− 1
2(1−) < 0:5 which implies
with regard to equation (17) that the P=0:5-locus intersects the -axis at positive values.
Thus, we must consider the relative power loci of all groups for the following analysis.
Suppose that ∗ = ∗ = 0:5−
2(1−) +  where  is some positive parameter which is innitely
47small such that 0 < ∗;∗ < 1. Using equation (14) we nd that
P (∗;∗) = 0:5−2(1−) ≤ 0:5





where obviously lim→0L(∗;∗) ≤ 0:5 for 0 <  < 0:5. It is straightforward to obtain an
analogous result for A(∗;∗) when using equation (16). We can therefore conclude that
for ∗ = ∗ = 0:5−
2(1−) + with 0 <  < 0:5 and small enough values of  no group is powerful
enough to rule the state on its own irrespective of the productivity environment Aa and Al.
From Proposition 1 it then follows that a democracy emerges as equilibrium outcome.
Proof of Proposition 2.2. The proof shows that for 0:5 ≤  < 1 and a given productivity
environment Aa and Al there exist  − combinations for which a democracy emerges in
equilibrium.
Since 0:5 ≤  < 1 holds we do not need to consider the P=0:5 locus in the following.
From equation (19) it can easily be seen that within the admissible  −  space the
A=0:5 locus is a continuously dierentiable and monotonically increasing function in 
which passes through the origin. Additionally, we know that for any given value of  an
increase in  increases the relative power of the A-group but decreases the relative power
of all others. Thus, for any given  the value of  which is necessary to reach a certain
relative power (like 0:5) must be higher for the A-group than for the L-group. Therefore
the A=0:5 locus always lies above the L=0:5 locus within the admissible − space. And
since both loci do not intersect and therefore cannot be identical due to P > 0 we can
conclude that, for a given productivity environment Aa and Al, there must always exist a
set of  − combinations such that L ≤ 0:5 ∧ A ≤ 0:5 holds. This establishes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof of Proposition 3.1. The proof shows that for 0 <  < 1 there exist − combinations
for which a mass dictatorship emerges in equilibrium irrespective of the productivity
48environment Aa and Al.
With regard to equations (17) and (20) we see that the P=0:5 locus is a parallel of the
sP locus where the former always lies below the latter. Thus for  ∈ (0;0:5) there always
exist admissible  −  combinations for which P > 0:5 ∧ sP > 0:5 holds independent of
the productivity environment Aa and Al. This also is true for  ∈ [0:5;1) since we already
know from the proof Proposition 2.2 that at least for small enough values of  there must
exist − combinations directly above the A=0:5 locus which satisfy these two conditions
with regard to group A.
Proof of Proposition 3.2. The proof shows that for 0 <  < 1 there exist  −  combi-
nations for which an oligarchy emerges in equilibrium irrespective of the productivity
environment Aa and Al.
Let us focus on the L=0:5 locus and highlight some of its properties. As can easily be
seen from equation (18) the L=0:5 locus has a pole at  = 0:5~(1−) and intersects the
abscissa at most twice for 1 = 0 and 2 = (0:5−)~(1−) with 0 < 2 < 0:5∀ ∈ (0;0:5)
and 2 ≤ 0∀ ∈ [0:5;1). Also @L~@ > 0∀ ≥ max[1;2] holds. Thus for  ∈ [0:5;1)
the L=0:5 locus is a continuously dierentiable and monotonously increasing function in
the admissible  set which passes through the origin. This implies that there always exists
a set of  −  combinations below the L=0:5 locus for which L > 0:5 ∧ sL < 0:5 holds
irrespective of the productivity environment Aa and Al. The same is true for  ∈ (0;0:5)
since 2 = max[1;2] < 0:5 implies that a set of such − combinations exists to the left
of the sL locus. This establishes the proof.
49Exemplary Figure for  < 0:5
Political equilibria for Al = Aa = 1; = 0:33.
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